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Abstract: Sparked by the recent great recession and the role of financial markets, considerable interest 
exists among researchers within both the academic and public community in measuring and modeling systemic 
risk. This article introduces a new framework for measuring systemic risk by using a risk-adjusted balance sheet 
approach. In this regard, the analysis of 21 largest commercial banks operating in 7 countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe, shows potential risk which could threaten all the financial system. The paper concludes new 
directions for measuring systemic risk by using Merton model. It shows how risk management tools can be applied 
in new ways to measure and analyze systemic risk in European banking system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The banking sector is by far the central part of the financial system in most of the emerging 
economies and is, therefore, also the main source of risk for financial stability. Traditional banking 
models do not adequately measure risk position of financial institutions and cannot be used to understand 
risk within and between balance sheets in the financial sector. A fundamental subject is that accounting 
balance sheets do not indicate risk exposures, which are forward-looking. Therefore, in the first step of 
this article author proposes the use of Merton's model, which is mainly used for option pricing as a way 
to assess the risk of insolvency of the company. The essence of this method is the connection of 
information  coming  from  the  company's  balance  sheet  and  market  data,  containing  part  of  future 
expectations of market participants. In particular, it seems important to use option pricing methodology, 
which takes into account the information contained in the market prices about the increasing risks in the 
financial system. The study is a continuation of previous studies carried CCA method for the Polish 
banking sector.  
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The main hypothesis is: Central and Eastern European banking systems are not devoid of systemic 
risk. The threat of a systemic crisis is ever-present.  
Merton's model has been used to measure banking systemic risk. The approach was applied to the 
21 commercial banks covered by Central and Eastern Europe during the period from December 2006 to 
December 2012. The findings suggest that the systemic risk indicator stood at its peak in March 2009, 
but in Hungarian banking system is still high.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 surveys the relevant literature on systemic risk and its 
reasons.  Section 2 presents the data sample and methodology applied. Section 3 presents the results of 
the investigation. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.  LITETERATURE REVIEW  
 
The problem of increasing systemic risk in the economy is again widely presented in the literature. 
Especially a lot on this subject can be read in the IMF reports (IMF, 2008; IMF 2009).  
The wide scope of research about systemic risk show that there is not a single and  agreed approach 
to this measurement. It suggests that measurements tools should support the understanding of linkages 
between financial institutions and the macroeconomy. The problem of systemic risk is complex and 
requires multiple measurements. In the literature review we have found a few specific approaches for 
assessing systemic risk along with different kind of data and models. 
The survey of Brownlees and Engle (2011), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and Acharya et al. 
(2010) presented how to use tail-risk measures to estimate solvency of the financial system. It measures 
interdependence in the tails of equity returns to financial institutions. MES measures the expected loss 
to each financial institution conditional on the entire set of institution s’ poor performance; CoVaR 
measures the value-at-risk (VaR) of financial institutions. 
 Estimation of tail dependence is problematic because of limited historical data of a financial crisis. 
The tail measurement helps to identify large aggregate shocks. This approach is interesting but has some 
critical questions – how equity returns transmitted disturbance to the macroeconomy? How big crisis 
could be expected? The tail measures is based on big public financial institutions. What about so-called 
shadow banking sector that are not publicly traded? The study of systemic risk measures based on 
analysis of equity returns emphasized also Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010).     
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The second approach is network models of the financial system. The information about financial 
firm network is very useful in prediction turbulences, but much more difficult to collect in dynamic 
financial system. Last time, Cont (2010) and Kim and Giesecke (2010) presented a network-based 
systemic risk measure. 
Smets and Wouters (2007) suggested dynamic and macroeconomic equilibrium models. This 
econometric  estimation  measures  the  transition  mechanisms  of  shocks  and  its  consequences  for 
macroeconomy. The survey remains a  question how important is the model? And how to identify 
consequences of shocks that are very large but infrequent?  
The  other  research  apply  Gray  and  Jobst  (2011),  Gapen  (2009)  known  as  contingent  claims 
analysis. It based on the use of option pricing theory for financial institutions where there is an underlying 
stochastic process for the value of their assets. This approach using investors’ market expectations in 
conjunction with equity-based measures of debt obligations uncertainty.  The advantages of model is 
connection of market risk appetite with balance sheets statements.  
The concept of credit risk measurement methods using CCA has a wide range of applications. 
American studies Gray and Malone (2011) used by central banks to support the analysis and management 
of financial risk management. The main analytical tool is the risk-adjusted balance sheet, which shows 
the sensitivity of the company's assets and liabilities to external "shocks" on the national and international 
level.  Traditional  approaches  may  have  a  problem  with  the  analysis  of  how  risks  can  accumulate 
gradually and then suddenly erupt in times of crisis. The CCA model approach is designed to overcome 
any "non-linearity" in the assets and liabilities, and between institutions. Simulations and stress tests, 
using risk-adjusted balance sheets are managing systemic risk. 
Along Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005), Lehar (2005) and Avesani, Pascual, and Li (2006) show 
alternative systemic risk indicators - default probabilities based on the credit default swap (CDS), equity 
or option market. 
Overview of the theoretical and empirical aspects of systemic risk measurement and management 
has enabled author to determine what was missed in previous studies and is the structural default risk 
modeling reasonable in CEE financial system? However, the using of multitude of methods caused 
unequivocal  conclusions.  There  is  no  doubt,  that  the  cause  of  it  is  the  randomness  of  economic 
phenomena that can’t be properly described by statistical model.    
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According to Schuermann, Pesaran, Treuler and Weiner, (2006) accounting balance sheets do not 
indicate risk exposures, which are forward-looking and express market risk. He has worked on linking 
the default risk of corporations with macroeconomic models. He underline that the main risk is we 
frequently left out of our models default risk in the financial sector. Gray and Jobst, (2009:128-131) 
pointed out that study of financial volatility has not been well served by economic theory.  
To manage and mitigate risk in financial sector there are needed new analytic tools and additional 
regulatory. Recent work has shown that financial sector risk indicators, such as the systemic expected 
losses or system default risk from Merton model, have big predictive power for GDP and the output gap 
Garcia, Gray, Luna and Restrepo, (2010). 
Author decided to use CCA method to calculate systemic risk in banking of European emerging 
markets. 
  
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The survey was based on systemic risk calculation in selected European banking systems, using 
Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA).   
In the first step - CCA method of systemic risk measures has been used to estimate the market 
value of the assets of European commercial banks listed on stock exchange. In the study it was applied 
quarterly data from a period of December 2006 - December 2012, because of limited availability of 
banking variables, which are listed on stock exchange.  
It was conducted for the selected 21 largest commercial banks from seven Central and Eastern 
European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania. Data on 
the size of selected assets and liabilities come from the banks’ financial statements, and market data were 
obtained from Reuters Eikon. Because of the attention to the most accurate results, the variables are 
related to quarterly  periods.  General  characteristics  of  the data used  to  calculate systemic risk  are 
presented in Table 1 (Annex). 
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2.1. CCA method description 
 
In order to understand the individual institutional exposure to systemic risk in times of crisis, the 
method of the CCA and its technique of using risk-based balance sheets of financial institutions are worth 
analyzing. The CCA method assumes that the total market value of bank assets at any time T is equal to 
the sum of the market value of equity E and its "risky" debt D at time T. The term of "risky debt" is due 
to the fact that there is always a chance of company insolvency. The regulation of payment of "risky 
debt" depends on the quality of bank assets, therefore being a claim against the assets of uncertain value. 
This type of claim is known as a conditional claim. The methodology of the study has been presented 
previously by Karkowska (2012). 
At the time of bankruptcy shareholders receive payment in the amount of A-B, if A> B, or do not 
receive anything if A <B, where A is the market value of the assets, B – the liabilities (without equity). 
Similarly, we can compare the situation of a shareholder to that of a holder of a call option on the assets 
of the company. Exercise of the option occurs when it is in-the-money, which means A> B, while in the 
opposite situation, when the option is out-of-the-money, the shareholder does not exercise it (the situation 
of loss of the ability to pay where A≤ B). 
The CCA method describes the relation between the value of assets and the capital of the analyzed 
subject, derived from the theory of Black-Scholes option pricing model (Hull, Nelken, White, 2003). 
 
ET=max[AT-B, 0] 
(2.1) 
where: 
ET - value of equity at the time T. 
Assets take a random distribution and may fall below the value of liabilities which is equal to the 
level of a bank failure B (often referred to as the "default point" or "distress barrier"). Using the Black-
Scholes-Merton model, the value of equity can be expressed as an implied call option on the bank assets 
with an exercise price equal to the level of B, which is expressed by the formula (2.1) (Gray, Malone, 
2011).  
ET=AT N(d1) – Be-rT N(d2) 
(2.2)    
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where:  
E
T – option value equal to the value of the bank capital at the time T,  
A
T – value of the underlying bank assets at the time T, 
B – exercise price equal to the value of liabilities, 
r – risk free rate, 
T – time to maturity option, 
N(d
i) – value of the distribution function for a standardized normal distribution equal to the argument d
i, 
where i=1, 2 
N(d2) – probability of exercising a call option, 
1-N(d2) = N(-d2) – probability of losing the ability to pay, 
d1=[ln(AT/B) + (r+σA
2/2)T]( σA√T)-1 
d2=d1 - σA√T 
σA – bank assets volatility. 
In the model, the variables E, B, T, r are directly observable, but the market value of bank assets 
(A) and its volatility (σA) are not directly observable. Therefore, in order to estimate the market value of 
the asset and its variability the relationship (Hull, 2003) was used as well. 
σE E = N(d1) σA A, 
(2.3) 
where:  
σE – volatility of the bank equity. 
With equations (2.2) and (2.3) we can calculate the market value of bank assets (A) and its volatility 
(σA) by successive iterations by comparing the two equations to zero. 
AT N(d1) – Be-rT N(d2) - ET = 0 
(2.4) 
N(d1) σA A - σE E = 0 
(2.5) 
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Minimizing the value of the expression (2.6) estimate the value of assets and volatility: 
 [AT N(d1) – Be-rT N(d2) - ET ]2 + [(N(d1) σA A - σE E]2  min 
(2.6) 
 
The estimated value is a market asset value, as assessed by investors. Let us assume that the relevant 
bank has a simple structure of financing (equity and foreign liabilities with maturity T). The bank’s loss 
of the ability to pay occurs when at the time T the value of the assets is smaller than the liabilities. It 
follows that the loss of solvency is a function of the capital structure, the volatility rate of return on assets 
and the current market value of assets. When marking the probability to lose the ability to pay by the 
bank Pdef we get: 
Pdef = Pr [V ≤ Vdef] = Pr [lnV ≤ Vdef] 
(2.7) 
When estimating the probability of losing the ability to pay in the KMV model defined by (2.7), 
we assume that the random variable – the return on assets adopts normal distribution, and therefore can 
be represented as a cumulative normal distribution of Pdef. Which means that we can find the value of a 
normally distributed variable Z, that decline in the value of assets below this level will mean the bank 
loss of the ability to pay: 
Pdef = Pr[lnA0 +[(μ - 
𝜎𝐴
2
2 t + 𝜎𝐴√𝑡 Zt ≤ln Adef] 
(2.8) 
After the appropriate transformations we can determine the probability as: 
Pdef = Pr [
ln(
𝑉0
𝑉???
)−(𝜇−
𝜎𝐴
2
2 )𝑡
𝜎𝐴√𝑡 ≥ 𝑍𝑡] =Pr[𝑍𝑡 ≤ − 
ln(
𝑉0
𝑉???
)−(𝜇−
𝜎𝐴
2
2 )𝑡
𝜎𝐴√𝑡 ]= N(-d2) 
(2.9) 
where: 
Pdef – probability of the bank failure, 
V0 – market assets value, 
Vdef – limit of the assets value  resulting in bankruptcy, 
σA – asset volatility, 
𝜇𝐴 – the actual expected rate of return on assets,    
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t – time to option expiration. 
The algorithm (2.9) is defined in literature as a DtD - Distance to Default, the number of standard 
deviations between the expected value of assets and the level of causing the loss of ability to pay. Use 
the process of estimating the likelihood of using KMV estimator turns out to be a better credit risk than 
the actual statistics of rating agencies - such conclusions were reached in the studies by (Kealhofer, 
McQuown and Vasicek, 2007). The distribution of assets at time T of the selected barrier solvency is 
presented in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of assets and the process of finding the probability of default 
 
 
As the risk-free rate is the central bank’s reference rate, while the market value of equity is adopted 
as the capitalization of individual banks on the stock exchange. The calculation of the assets market value 
is based on Merton’s model and were calculated by means of Microsoft Excel Solver.   
  
      
C CE ES S   W Wo or rk ki in ng g   P Pa ap pe er rs s   – Volume V, Issue 4   
 
 
543 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  
In this paper, we advocate a methodology to measure the systemic risk of banking systems in 
selected CEE countries.  We applied this methodology to the 21 banks covered by largest commercial 
banks listed on stock exchange. The results are presented in Table 2 (Annex). 
The highest values of systemic risks shall cover the period of the financial crisis (September 2008 
- June 2009) in the banking system Polish and Hungarian. In the individual analysis most threatened 
were: BRE Bank, Bank BPH, OTP Bank. The period before the crisis, most of it can be assumed to be 
safe, with the exception of individual units: ING Bank, Bank BPH and Latvijas Krajbanka. Wonder and 
anxiety can raise the fact that there is still a danger systemic risk in the CEE countries that are considered 
safe. The study showed that even in December 2012, the analysis showed worrying developments in 
Hungary,  where  the  underestimation  of  OTP  Bank's  assets  fall  below  EUR  3  000  million.  Also 
questionable situation is in: the Bulgarian, Romanian, Lithuanian and Latvian banking system. Risk map 
shows that only individual banks, such as the Czech Komercni Banka, Bulgarian Corporate Commercial 
Bank, the Polish Bank Pekao and PKO BP did not show systemic risk threat throughout the research. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of our study was to calculate the systemic risk in CEE banking systems and identify its 
changes. We also try to investigate the determinants of these banking instability using panel regression 
models. Our results present interesting conclusions. Firstly, we do support to the recent economist survey 
on the increased systemic risk complexity and heterogeneity. Our results show that banking instability is 
changing  across  countries  and  time.  Models  provide  measurement  frameworks  and  facilitate 
communication and criticism. Our measures is not perfect, as was mentioned in the introduction has 
flaws, but it seems to be considered to support policy discussion and analysis. May be as CEE banking 
early warning indicators, such as in the stress testing exercise. The survey could be the step to expanded 
new regulation and put pressures on banking supervision to develop useful measurements of systemic 
risk. Secondly, we create the map of the most and least instable banking systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe and confirm instability of CEE banking systems still yet. The above-mentioned decomposition    
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could be used to examine to what degree the CEE banking instability can be explained by the risk 
premium versus default risk component.  
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ANNEX 
Table 1 - Model CCA data description 
Country  Bank  Median of equity 
value (EUR mln) 
Average book value 
of assets (EUR mln) 
Average market 
capitalisation (EUR 
mln) 
Average systemic 
risk (EUR mln) 
ulgarian banking system 
Bulgarian-American Credit Bank  93,27  376,98  99,79  -33,53 
Central Cooperative Bank  117,33  872,21  69,40  -82,38 
Corporate Commercial Bank  143,23  1089,15  230,77  41,36 
First Investment Bank  206,62  2190,15  134,26  -105,65 
Bulgarian summary  560,45  4528,49  534,21  -180,20 
Romanian banking system 
Banca Comerciala Carpatica  49,97  520,04  82,48  -46,26 
Banca Transilvania  320,20  3559,33  456,30  115,51 
Romanian summary  370,16  4079,37  538,78  69,25 
Latvian banking system 
Latvijas Krajbanka  51,83  731,74  46,68  -36,00 
Latvian summary  51,83  731,74  46,68  -36,00 
Lithuanian banking system 
Bankas Snoras  159,90  2606,24  127,51  -110,10 
Siauliu Bankas  74,52  601,58  62,26  -17,10 
Ukio Bankas  124,27  1223,89  86,24  -50,66 
Lithuanian Summary  358,69  4431,71  276,01  -177,87 
Hungarian banking system 
FHB Jelzalogbank  120,37  2105,41  228,42  -20,67 
OTP Bank  2395,89  22151,28  4503,88  447,34 
Hungarian summary  2516,26  24256,68  4732,30  426,68 
Czech banking system 
Komercni Banka  2123,66  23160,57  4723,75  2609,25 
Czech summary  2123,66  23160,57  4723,75  2609,25 
Polish banking system 
Bank PEKAO   2997,33  23483,30  9771,56  5066,85 
BRE Bank  897,03  13391,28  2627,41  383,74 
ING Bank  974,02  11841,53  2406,85  313,96 
Millenium  638,87  7772,16  1395,08  71,58 
PKO BP  3615,12  32329,99  11464,97  6025,09 
Bank HANDLOWY  1466,79  9424,69  2613,19  555,73 
BOS Bank  207,08  2479,23  301,27  -74,45 
Bank BPH  1182,94  10609,36  702,41  -1579,67 
Polish summary  11979,18  111331,55  31282,75  2690,71 
Source: own calculation 
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Table 2 - Systemic risk map in CEE banking systems during the period December 2012 - December 2006 (mil. EUR)  
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